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Introduction

In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama took pains to detail
the obstacles America overcame under his leadership while simultaneously detailing the
middle class struggle. In this speech, like many others,1 the President emphasized the
necessity for us to rebuild our economy so that America would remain competitive
amongst technologically advancing countries. His plans of actions were multi-faceted. But
as leaders in other countries have often done, he looked to the education of America’s
youth as a means to soothe our economic woes:
Tonight, I’m announcing a new challenge to redesign America’s high schools so they
better equip graduates for the demands of a high-tech economy. We’ll reward
schools that develop new partnerships with colleges and employers, and create
classes that focus on science, technology, engineering, and math—the skills today’s
employers are looking for to fill jobs right now and in the future. 2
This is part of the Obama administration’s larger legislation designed to spur reform, Race
to the Top. Where previous administrations have had more straightforward and pointed
funding toward reform, Race to the Top calls itself a contest designed to foster reform
rather than strictly to reform.3 And it is indeed a contest. Race to Top, as its name suggests,

1

See President Obama’s State of the Union in 2010 and 2012 as well.
The White House. "Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address." The White House.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-unionaddress (accessed April 5, 2014).
3 See the education portion of the White House website:
"Reform for the Future." The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/reform
And the executive summary of Race to the Top: Race to the Top Program: Executive Summary, U.S.
Department of Education, Washington D.C. November 2009,
(http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf)
2

2
is a race. School districts, counties, and organizations all apply for grant money to “win.”4
Each application is awarded points based on their students’ test performances and STEM
oriented reform Applications are judged against each other using this point system. Above,
President Obama speaks of the main judgment criteria – an education that best fosters
skills for the “demands of a high tech economy.” As a result, the focus has become primarily
on math, science, and engineering purely because these studies create the “skills” needed.
These skills, according to our president, will equip graduates for the jobs our economy
needs to repair itself. Of course, having skills that will make graduates easily employable is
not negative. And there is nothing wrong with studying STEM. The problem comes not from
the studying of these disciplines, but from the reason why people have chosen to focus
them. An education heavily focused on practical skills, has created an education geared
toward instrumentality. The Obama administration uses this education as a means, not as
an end in itself. On the White House website for Race to the Top, it clearly states the
legislation’s ultimate end which it hopes to use education as a means for:
America’s ability to compete begins each day, in classrooms across the nation—
and President Obama knows we must comprehensively strengthen and reform our
education system in order to be successful in a 21st century economy. The case for
the link between the strength of American education and the strength of our
economy is a simple one—and it is one that all Americans can agree on. Ensuring
that every student in our country graduates from high school prepared for college
and a successful career is central to rebuilding our economy and securing a brighter
economic future for all Americans.5

4

Race to the Top Program: Executive Summary, U.S. Department of Education, Washington D.C.
November 2009, (http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf) 3.
5 “Reform for the Future." The White House.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/reform
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According to this text, America’s economy not only reflects the state of our education, but
also depends on these children in classrooms who must compete every day. Because Race
to the Top is a contest, these students do literally compete every day to pass these tests and
receive funding. It seems that winning this competition, would ensure a happy financially
secure life in a bustling economy for those students. But because the main goal
underscoring this education is its instrumentality to compete in the global economic
market, the students are not only responsible for their own futures, but for future of the
American economy as well.
Hannah Arendt would find the responsibility that children and students are forced
to take on under this system immensely problematic. In her controversial essay,
“Reflections on Little Rock,”6 Arendt points to the children, who were forced to desegregate
by court order, as taking on the burdens of adults. She writes,
It certainly did not require too much imagination to see that this was to burden
children, black and white, with the working out of a problem, which adults for
generations have confessed themselves unable to solve…
And then more specifically, on Elizabeth Eckford,7 the first African American girl the whole
nation watched walk to a formerly “whites only” school,

6

Arendt’s extremely controversial essay that problematized the de-segregation in schools, it is still
widely contested. I do not de-segregation in public schools should not have happened in 1956.
Many color Arendt’s essay incorrectly as racist or overbearing. I think this sort of reading is
reductive and untrue. Arendt, who experienced Nazi Germany, was deeply anxious about any kind
of forced takeover of social sphere, limiting the private wishes of individuals. I would hazard a
guess that this might be where these sentiments are rooted. Regardless, Arendt used desegregation in schools as context to illustrate her philosophy that conserves private space. I bring
this essay in only to further illustrate this philosophy.
7 Arendt speaks of the newspaper photo of a little girl being escorted to school with a white mob
trailing behind her. Often this image is thought to be Ruby Bridges, who inspired the Norman
Rockwell painting, “The Problem We All Live With.” The painting depicts a little girl on her way to
school, escorted by U.S. Marshalls, walking past racial slurs scrawled on the wall behind her. But
Ruby attended the first grade in New Orleans, in 1960, three years after the de-segregation of Little

4
The girl, obviously, was asked to be a hero—that is, something neither her absent
father nor the equally absent representatives of the NAACP felt called upon to be…
Have we now come to the point where it is the children who are being asked to
change or improve the world? And do we intend to have our political battles fought
out in the schoolyards?8

Arendt paints the adults willing to make children fight their battles for them as cowards,
shirking the responsibility of the world they ruined to be inherited by children. Arendt’s
disgust derives from her focus on the dichotomy of public and private life, which pervades
almost her entire corpus. The public interests of the government being taken up by
children, who as children have a right to an immensely private life, was very disturbing to
Arendt:
Because the child must be protected against the world, his traditional place is in the
family, whose adult members daily return back from the outside world and
withdraw into the security of private life within four walls. These four walls, within
which people’s private family life is lived, constitute a shield against the world and
specifically against the public aspect of the world. They enclose a secure place,
without which no living thing can thrive. This holds good not only for the life of
childhood but for human life in general. Wherever the latter is consistently exposed
to the world without the protection of privacy and security its vital quality is
destroyed.9

Rock. Little Rock, in contrast, did not take place with young elementary school students but nine
high school students, known as “The Little Rock Nine.” If discussing Little Rock specifically, Arendt
may have been talking about Elizabeth Eckford, a young woman, escorted by the National Guard.
Arendt describes a young girl being escorted by a friend of her father’s, though this in line with the
story of Ruby Bridges.
8 Original publication: Arendt, Hannah. "Reflections on Little Rock." Dissent (Winter 1959).
Cited:
Scanned copy of “Reflections on Little Rock” Commentary, a journal that first refused to publish her
article, but acquiesced a year later. It is available online here. The pages numbers used will
correspond to this publication.
Arendt, Hannah. “Reflections on Little Rock.”
http://learningspaces.org/forgotten/little_rock1.pdf. 50.
9 Arendt, Hannah. "A Crisis in Education." In Between Past and Future; eight exercises in political
thought. Engl. ed. New York: Viking Press, 1968. 182-183.
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According to Arendt, the vital quality of human life is destroyed when we are consistently
exposed to the public “without the protection of privacy or security.” Arendt follows this by
remarking that the lack of privacy is why children of famous parents often “turn out so
badly.”10 School, for children, is a place of transition from the private life of the family to the
public life of the world. 11 It should be handled very carefully so as to not completely breach
the sense of security that children still need before being thrust completely into the public
realm. For Arendt, the risk of Race to the Top would be the compromising of this not yet
public space.
What I contend Race to the Top threatens is not private life alone, but the personal
activities, faculties, and passions that come along with it. The narrow focus on STEM is not
the sole problem. Nor is it problematic for us to aid young people in obtaining secure
financial futures. Rather, the problem lies in a pedagogy driven alone by instrumentality.
This instrumentality, using education as a means to fix our economic troubles, has resulted
in pedagogy only interested in quantifiable or testable skills. Rote learning and rote testing
has dramatically increased in order to satisfy this need for a practical economic output
from education. In turn, these concerns for practical economic output have fostered the
current high stakes testing culture. With funding and success dependent on many of these
poorly designed exams issued by “the Common Core” or the state testing boards, public
school children are showing anxiety at startlingly young ages.12 With students as young as

Arendt, Hannah. "A Crisis in Education." 182-183.
Arendt, Hannah. “The Crisis in Education.” 185.
12 Here is just one look from just one of the many articles being published on links between
negative anxiety and testing. This was published in 1984, when there were dramatically fewer tests,
and our government was not anxious to repair the nation from economic collapse. Here is a passage
that predicts the results if current trends continued:
10
11
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kindergarteners exhibiting stressful responses to high stakes testing, studies show that the
students understand the enormity of the responsibility that comes with these tests in
comparison to their normal evaluative tests given by teachers. 13 These tests breed an
educational environment of intense pressure, leaving little time for students to explore
their passions or interests that might have less practical outputs. The humanities and arts,
thought to have less practical capabilities, have become devalued as a result of this
education driven by instrumentality.14 Even studying science, because it peaks your
curiosity or wonder finds no place in this standardized test-driven pedagogy.
I contend that in this new pedagogy, no space is given to a student’s personal
passion and subjective necessity. Students are not encouraged to do something because

Furthermore, several recent educational trends are likely to increase anxiety among school-aged
children. As the consequences of test performance assume a more important role in school, such as
determining whether a child is promoted to the next grade (or eventually receives a high school
diploma), children will experience strong apprehension about evaluation, and as a result many of
these students will do even less well (Hill 1984). Similarly, the increased use of test scores to evaluate
educational programs and greater public pressure for high levels of skill learning and achievement in
schools create a more pressure-laden atmosphere. This pressure also should result in more children
experiencing strong debilitating anxiety. If these trends continue, the problem of anxiety may become
even more serious over the next few years.
13

Segool, Natasha K., John S. Carlson, Anisa N. Goforth, Nathan Von Der Embse, and Justin A.
Barterian. "Heightened Test Anxiety Among Young Children: Elementary School Students’ Anxious
Responses To High-Stakes Testing." Psychology in the Schools 50, no. 5 (2013): 489-499.
Fleege, Pamela O., Rosalind Charlesworth, Diane C. Burts, and Craig H. Hart. "Stress Begins In
Kindergarten: A Look At Behavior During Standardized Testing." Journal of Research in Childhood
Education 7, no. 1 (1992): 20-26.
14 Martha Nussbaum, in her book, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities, goes into
this point in great depth. She too, sees no issue with STEM education, but rather points to the
negative impacts of this practically driven education on our students and the world. She makes the
case that the humanities, as well as STEM, when taught properly foster the capacities needed to
engage in global citizenship and democracy. Taking examples form America and India, she shows
readers what exactly is at stake in a loss of the humanities. She writes that if we continue down this
path we will be creating, “nations of technically trained people who do not know how to criticize
authority, useful profit makers without imagination…a suicide of the soul.”
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Not for profit: why democracy needs the humanities. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2010. 142.
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they feel it creates meaning or is essential to their lives, because these are not practical or
public reasons. I put forth that these personal endeavors correspond to Arendt’s private
realm and make up the vita contemplativa, or contemplation. But Arendt has already
declared these subjective activities, contemplation, to be “meaningless” in her book, The
Human Condition. She writes,
If we compare the modern world with that of the past, the loss of human experience
involved in this development is extraordinarily striking. It is… contemplation, which
has become an entirely meaningless experience15

For Arendt, the contemplative life, which exists as an element of private life, would have
trouble finding its place in an education driven by collective instrumentality and public
desires. But this drive for instrumentality has existed long before Race to the Top, and its
longstanding prevalence in western thought might have been what led Arendt to declare
vita contemplativa to be overtaken by and then rendered obsolete by vita activa. This
project seeks to combat Arendt’s claim of contemplation as meaningless, and expand its
definition, showing its relevance and persistence in our own world, despite mounting
obstacles, such as Race to the Top and others.
Contemplation, understandably, can sound like a privileged and leisurely pursuit.
While I acknowledge the roots of contemplation to be in a privileged class, this is no longer
the case. Nor is contemplation synonymous with leisure. Necessarily left out of the
following project is the classical dichotomy of otium and negotium, the division that
differentiates one’s time. Otium designated a time apart from duty, where one could spend
time relaxing and doing what one pleased in leisure, while negotium designated a time for

15

Arendt. The Human Condition. 322-323
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duty or work. Contemplation could occur in the time designated for otium. But within that
time of leisure, one could also take part in entertaining or escapist activities,such as games
or baths, which would not fall under contemplation. With cursory glance, leisure might
seem to share some of the aims of a contemplative life in contrast to that of the active. But
contemplation, as seen in the following chapters, must always be a deeply engaging and
meaningful practice, which satisfies one far beyond the desire for entertainment alone.
Before proceeding, one more distinction of the project is necessary; this is a project
of both literature and philosophy. Using careful close readings to support an argument, a
methodology that both disciplines share, this project responds to Arendt. The project can
be seen most clearly as a philosophy project in that it responds to Arendt, using her work
to frame the project. Thus, I deal within her terms, necessarily dealing with the attitudes
toward public and private life in each chapter as context and influence on the writings and
tradition of vita contemplativa. Though I respond to Arendt in ways most necessary for my
argument, I differ from her in that I give more attention to Rome, rather than Greece, and
give ample time to the thinkers of the Middle Ages. The chapter on Cicero’s Rome not only
provides the scholarship missing from Arendt’s work, but also shows a society more
similar to us than that of medieval Europe. The public-oriented existence of the Romans
shares similarities with our own public-obsessed world, providing a context in which
expanding the definition of contemplation can be more fruitful in its comparisons to our
own society. Though very different from us, the medieval chapter of this work acts as a
foundation, showing contemplation during its supposed high point. Without this
foundation, the project would have little to stand on. My argument against Arendt’s claim
that contemplation has become meaningless, in many ways, hinges on a deep

9
understanding of these medieval thinkers. These close readings require necessary
historical context, but the project remains one not of history. If it were, I would be making
broad stroke historical claims to people and their lives everywhere, which I am not. I seek
instead to find and recover meaning from a tradition thought to be lost, illuminating how
its tremendous value might be taken into consideration when we visualize and think about
our own lives in an immensely public and practical-minded world.

10

I: Old Wounds: Contemplation in the Lives of Twelfth- and
Thirteenth-Century Thinkers

“Si universos lucreris, te unum perdens?”
Matthew 16:26

The question, “What does it profit you to gain the whole world, but lose yourself
alone?” is at the core of the first book of Bernard of Clairvaux’ s De Consideratione. Our sole
defense, according to Bernard, is through contemplation. Contemplation preserves the self.
In the classical world, it is most associated with philosophy. During the period that this
chapter focuses on, the twelfth century, contemplation pursues the knowledge and
communion with God. It is self-indulgent, a means to its own end. Contemplation
corresponds to the private, in that the practice of contemplation happens in a private realm
and indulges private concerns. It is a personal endeavor, done for the self. And like the
notion of “private, ” contemplation has its counterpart in action or the active life. Action
occurs in the public realm, means to to a collectively pursued end. The terms vita activa and
vita contemplativa are instrumental in Arendt’s thinking; though not her own terms, Action
would later become one of the most read and discussed chapters in courses that might
include any part of The Human Condition. However, there is no chapter in her work on
contemplation. And while contemplation occupies pages of classical and here, medieval
thought, Arendt, as seen in the introduction to this project, pronounces that contemplation
“has become meaningless” in the modern age.16 What could possibly strip contemplation,

16

Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. 322.
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the exercise at the center of many foundational thinkers, of its meaning? This chapter seeks
to illustrate and explore contemplation at its perceived high point, the mid-twelfth- century
to the late thirteenth-century, from the Cistercian order to the beginnings of the Dominican
and Franciscan order. I seek to show that even during this period, with the shift from
cloisters, to Cathedral schools, and finally to universities; there came too a shift in focus
from vita contemplativa to vita activa. This shift shows that our own era is unoriginal in its
focus on collective or public need rather than subjective private necessity. Thus, the status
of contemplation in this period is not so different from its existence in our own time, as
something lusted after despite mounting obstacles.
On Consideration, the text that motivates this chapter was written as “advice to a
pope,” between 1148 and 1153. The pope, Eugenius III, was the first of the Cistercian order
to hold the position. Bernard, a fellow member of the Cistercian order, was deeply invested
in the success of his former monk and saw it fit to send him this advice. In this text, Bernard
is concerned that in gaining the responsibilities of the papal office, this new Cistercian pope
will lose sight of his own responsibilities to himself. While the words of advice are aimed at
a new pope, the concerns expressed can be applied far more broadly. Bernard warns of a
life swallowed by public duty, bereft of private fulfillment and salvation. But contrary to
Bernard’s concerns and constant prioritization of the contemplative life over that of active,
zeal for contemplation faded in a very visible way in the latter half of the twelfth century.
The movement from the monastery, to the university, cloister to city, and creation of the
Dominican Order gave birth to the influential man and scholastic exemplar, Thomas
Aquinas. Through these movements, we see an increased emphasis on the active and
subsequently public life. Though Bernard prized contemplation over all other concerns, he

12
himself had an extremely active life. He saw himself as an exception, but others began to
see him as the ideal. We see the result of this disparity.
Aristotle
Bernard was not the first to use the term vita activa and vita contemplativa. In fact,
as it was alluded to in the previous chapter, a similar use of “contemplative” also appears in
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. After elaborating on the moral virtues and their vices,
Aristotle finally arrives at contemplation in the last book of Nichomachean Ethics. Very
simply, the book is concerned with activities that point or lead to the good. But
contemplation is said to do this better than anything previously mentioned and bring us
closer to eudaimonia, which is often translated as “happiness.” Aristotle writes,
Now, if happiness is activity in conformity with virtue, it is to be expected that it
should conform to the highest virtue; and that is the virtue of the best part of us.
Whether this is intelligence or something else which, it is thought, by its very nature
rules and guides us and which gives us notions of what is noble and divine; whether
it is itself divine or the most divine thing in us; it is the activity of this part (when
operating) in conformity with the excellence or virtue proper to it that will be
complete happiness. That it is an activity concerned with the theoretical knowledge
or contemplation has already been stated.17

Contemplation, theōria in the Greek, is said to be the activity in accordance with the
“highest virtue.” It is the most continuous and a godlike activity. Only gods can contemplate
endlessly, but we should, nevertheless, try to model ourselves on them. Contemplation is
an end within itself, unlike the virtues and other activities mentioned that are all a means.
Other virtues are important, but it is contemplation that supersedes all of them.

17

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald, (Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, 1999) Book
X, 7. 288.
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Common Biblical Figures
After Aristotle, but before Bernard, early church fathers too wrote on
contemplation. Not unlike the concepts of Aristotle or Bernard, contemplation is “an end
within itself,” and the “most continuous” and god-like activity. Common to all the church
fathers is the use of biblical figures to illustrate the active and contemplative dichotomy.
Origen, Augustine, Gregory, and eventually Bernard all discuss the terms through the
figures of Rachel and Leah and Mary and Martha.
In Genesis, Jacob comes to the Laban’s land to find Rachel with a flock. She returns
to her father, Laban, to tell him that Jacob has arrived. Jacob stays to work for Laban, in
which Laban offers him a “reward” of his choosing:
respondit: Os meum es, et caro mea. Et postquam impleti sunt dies mensis
unius, dixit ei: Num quia frater meus es, gratis servies mihi? dic quid mercedis
accipias. Habebat vero duas filias: nomen majoris Lia, minor vero appellabatur
Rachel. Sed Lia lippis erat oculis: Rachel decora facie, et venusto aspectu. Quam
diligens Jacob, ait: Serviam tibi pro Rachel filia tua minore, septem annis. Respondit
Laban: Melius est ut tibi eam dem quam alteri viro: mane apud me. Servivit ergo
Jacob pro Rachel septem annis: et videbantur illi pauci dies præ amoris
magnitudine. 18
And he waited till a month had passed; then he said, Because thou art my kinsman,
that is no reason why thou shouldst work for me free of charge; tell me what reward
thou wouldst have. Laban had two daughters; Rachel was the younger and her elder
sister was called Leah. But Leah was dull-eyed, whereas Rachel had beauty both of
form and face, and on her Jacob’s love had fallen. So he answered, I will work seven
years for thee to win thy younger daughter Rachel. Better thou, said Laban, than any
other husband I could find for her; stay, then, at my side. So Jacob worked seven
years to win Rachel, and they seemed to him only a few days, because of the
greatness of his love.19

18

Genesis 29:14-20

19Knox Translation.

Copyright © 2013 Westminster Diocese Nihil Obstat.
Father Anton Cowan, Censor. http://www.newadvent.org/bible/gen029.htm (If translation is not
cited, it is my own work.)
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The tale is often interpreted as one of perseverance and hard work for a desired end. Jacob
sees Rachel as the more desirable of the two sisters and works seven years for the marriage
he assumes he will receive. But after an unexpected decision on Laban’s part, Jacob is
tricked into marrying Leah after the first seven years and must work a subsequent seven
years to attain Rachel. The more beautiful in face and other aspects or decora facie et
venusto aspectu, yet barren, Rachel represents the contemplative life, and the fertile but
bleary-eyed or “dull-eyed,” lippis,20 Leah, the active life.
The other figures utilized are the New Testament sisters, Mary and Martha. In Luke
10, Christ visits their home:
Factum est autem, dum irent, et ipse intravit in quoddam castellum: et mulier
quædam, Martha nomine, excepit illum in domum suam, et huic erat soror nomine
Maria, quæ etiam sedens secus pedes Domini, audiebat verbum illius. Martha autem
satagebat circa frequens ministerium: quæ stetit, et ait: Domine, non est tibi curæ
quod soror mea reliquit me solam ministrare? dic ergo illi ut me adjuvet. Et
respondens dixit illi Dominus: Martha, Martha, sollicita es, et turbaris erga
plurima, porro unum est necessarium. Maria optimam partem elegit, quæ non
auferetur ab ea. 21
In one of the villages he entered during his journey, a woman called Martha
entertained him in her house. She had a sister called Mary; and Mary took her place
at the Lord’s feet, and listened to his words. Martha was distracted by waiting on
many needs; so she came to his side, and asked, Lord, art thou content that my sister
should leave me to do the serving alone? Come, bid her help me. Jesus answered her,
Martha, Martha, how many cares and troubles thou hast! But only one thing is
necessary; and Mary has chosen for herself the best part of all, that which shall
never be taken away from her.22

Martha is quite literally very active and concerned with far more worldly things, while her
sister is focused on Jesus Christ who is currently residing in their home. Christ tells Martha

20

C. Plautius uses lippus to mean literally blind or enflamed in his text about the Roman wars. Lippus in other
contexts can mean blind to something, as in information or an action.
21
22

Genesis 29:14-20
Knox translation.
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that the cares she has will all eventually fall away. Mary is the sister who has chosen to
concern herself with optimam partem or “the best part of all,” and this “part…shall never be
taken away from her.” This “part” meaning her devotion to Christ over worldly matters,
will outlast any other duty that her worldly life will require of her. Her devotion will be
continuous into her afterlife, while Martha’s concerns will not.
Gregory the Great

Gregory the Great uses both sets of figures in his Moralia in Job written between 578
and 595 AD. First, we see the story of Leah and Rachel.
It is hence that Jacob serves for Rachel, and gets Leah, and that it is said to him, It is
not the custom in our country to give the youngest before the first-born. For Rachel
is rendered ‘the beginning seen ,’ but ‘Leah,’ ‘laborious.’ And what is denoted by
Rachel but the contemplative life? What by Leah, but the active life? For in
contemplation ‘the Beginning,’ which is God, is the object we seek, but in action we
labor under a weighty bundle of wants. Whence on the one hand Rachel is beautiful
but barren, Leah weak eyed, but fruitful, truly in that when the mind seeks the ease
of contemplation, it sees more, but it is less productive in children to God. But when
it betakes itself to the laborious work of preaching, it sees less, but it bears more
largely. Accordingly after the embrace of Leah, Jacob attains to Rachel, in that every
one that is perfect is first joined to an active life in productiveness, and afterwards
united to a contemplative life in rest.23

As mentioned in brief earlier, Leah, though “weak eyed,” is “fruitful” because she can
produce more offspring. But Rachel, though barren, is beautiful. When the mind turns itself
toward contemplation, it produces less, but “sees more.” And when turned toward an active
life, it produces more, but “sees less.” Embedded in his phrasing is the notion of the mind
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“seeing” more or less. While he does not state it explicitly, this use of sight stands in for a
sort of access to the divine, which one can become more privy to through contemplation.
Similar to Aristotle’s use of contemplation, contemplation brought with it access to truth.
But instead of access to truth alone, for Gregory, it is an access to God. Contemplation is the
most heavenly or divine sort of aspects of live attainable on earth. After discussing Leah
and Rachel at length, Gregory then moves to Mary and Martha,
For that the life of contemplation is less indeed in time [i.e. age], but greater in value
than the active, we are shown by the words of the Holy Gospel, wherein two women
are described to have acted in different ways. For Mary sat at our Redeemer's feet,
hearing His words, but Martha eagerly prosecuted bodily services; and when Martha
made complaint against Mary's inactivity, she heard the words, Martha, Martha,
thou art careful and troubled about many things; but one thing is needful: and Mary
hath chosen that good part, which shall not be taken away from her. [Luke 10, 41.
42.] For what is set forth by Mary, who sitting down gave ear to the words of our
Lord, saving the life of contemplation? And what by Martha, so busied with outward
services, saving the life of action? Now Martha's concern is not reproved, but that of
Mary is even commended. For the merits of the active life are great, but of the
contemplative, far better. Whence Mary's part is said to be ‘never taken away from
her,’ in that the works of the active life pass away together with the body, while the
joys of the contemplative life are made more lively at the end.24
This passage furthers Gregory’s point of contemplation being more eternal, and more
divine. As discussed earlier, and in Gregory’s own words, the important part of this passage
lies in Christ’s words to Martha about her sister, returning to this “part.” This is Mary’s
choice of a more eternal activity. or one that is “more lively at the end.” Evident here in
both passages is a privileging of the contemplative life over that of the active. (“For the
merits of the active life are great, but of the contemplative, far better.”) But it is
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characteristic of Gregory’s writings to never have a complete dismissal of active life, rather
an emphasis that both are necessary. This was evident in both of these Old Testament and
New Testament figures.
Prior to those figures, Gregory engages further with this dichotomy in a unique
way.25 He again acknowledges the superiority of the contemplative life compared to the
active life. But then warns of an overly contemplative life for a person not fit for
contemplation. Referencing a passage from Matthew 5:29-30, he states,
…Some restless spirits, whilst by contemplation they hunt out more than their wits
compass, launch out even to the length of wrong doctrines, and, whilst they have no
mind to be the disciples of Truth in a spirit of humility, they become the masters of
falsities. It is hence that ‘Truth’ saith by His own lips, And if thy right eye offend
thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee; for it is profitable for thee to enter into life
with one eye, rather than having two eyes be cast into hell fire. For the two lives, the
active and the contemplative, when they be preserved in the soul, are accounted as
two eyes in the face.26
And while this metaphor of plucking out an eye may seem like a strange metaphor to use,
considering the outright privilege that the contemplative life is acknowledged to have, it
achieves an important nuance. As Aristotle also acknowledged that not all were capable of
contemplation, Gregory makes a similar point. For some, contemplation leads them astray.
The contemplative life is overwhelming. In these cases, it would be best to “pluck out” the
right eye, or remove contemplation from your life. As unfortunate it must be to miss out on
the indulgence that is the contemplative life, the active life can still bring you to salvation. It
25

The metaphor still stems from scripture, coming from Matthew 5:29-30. It is unique in that it does not have
the long tradition like that of Leah and Rachel, Mary and Martha.
26 St. Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, trans. John Henry Parker and J.Rivington, (Oxford, 1844),
accessed November 23rd, 2013, http://www.lectionarycentral.com/GregoryMoralia/Book06.html, Book VI ,
57.
Original Source: Matthew 5:29-30

18
would be better to live an active life pointed toward salvation than a contemplative one
comprised of “misbelief. ” Not all are capable of contemplation. One could make a mistake
of faith in some way as a result of over-contemplating, or come to an incorrect conclusion.
Bernard of Clairvaux
Bernard’s On Consideration also makes use of biblical figures and metaphors.
Concerned heavily with the active and contemplative life in the first two books, his text is
directed at Pope Eugenius III’s transition from the cloistered life of a monk to the very
active duties of a pope. Through the story of Leah and Rachel and a comparison to a
wound, Bernard illustrates the deep pleasure of the contemplative life and the pain that
comes with the lack of it. These notions of pain and pleasure actually work together to
characterize the overt privileging of the contemplative life over active life, and the intense
desire that accompanies it.
Like the figures of Rachel and Leah, a discussion of “wounds” is not particular to
Bernard. Masses were often dedicated to the “five sacred wounds” of Christ in prayer, going
through each wound. And later than Bernard’s time, five rosary beads were often dedicated
to the five wounds, requiring a prayer at each bead.27 The wound first appears in On
Consideration when Bernard shows sympathy for the grief that Eugenius III must be
experiencing, or rather, should be experiencing. In case Eugenius is not indeed grieving, as
he should, Bernard enlightens him:
Novi quibus deliciis dulcis quietis tuae non longe antehac fruebare. Non potes his
dissuevisse tam cito, non potes ita subito non dolere nuper subtractas.
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Plaga recens dolore non caret. Neque enim iam occalvit vulnus, nec in tam brevi
versum in insensibile est. Quamquam, si non dissimules, non deest tibi iugis materia
iusti doloris a quotidians damnis.28

I am aware of the pleasant delights of solitude you enjoyed not long ago. You cannot
have become unaccustomed to them this quickly. You cannot so suddenly cease to
grieve for them: they were only recently taken from you. A fresh wound cannot fail
to cause grief. Your wound has not yet begun to heal; in so short a time its pain has
not ceased. Furthermore, unless you deceive yourself, there is continual cause for
legitimate grief from daily injuries.29
The wound, the injury that is left after contemplation is torn away, is still fresh. Bernard
uses two different words for wound here, the first plaga, and the second and more familiar
vulnus. Plaga, which John D. Anderson and Elizabeth T. Kennan translate here as “fresh
wound,” can also mean the strike or blow that causes the recent injury. After one has just
lost the time for contemplation, the pain is obvious after a recent blow. In the same way
one might get a paper cut, albeit a much less intense wound compared the nature of what is
discussed here, while reading and then fixate on the new affliction. After receiving the
paper cut, most cease their obsession, and get back to what they were reading. And so
because this is a recent blow, a plaga, Eugenius must be aware of his injury. And therefore,
it is hard not to notice it, to grieve. The danger comes when this plaga, becomes a vulnus, a
wound that is not recent.
Noli nimis credere addectui tuo qui nunc est. Nil tam fixum animo, quod neglect et
tempore non obsolescat. Vulneri vetusto et neglecto callus obducitur, et eo
insanabile, quo insensibile fit. Denique dolor continuus et acerbus, diuturnus eese
non patitur. Nam si non aliunde extunditur, necesse est cedat vel sibi. Enimvero cito
aut de remedio consolationem recipient, aut de assiduitate stuporem.30
Bernard de Clairvaux, De Consideratione, (Romae, Editiones Cistercienses, 1963) Book I, I
Bernard of Clairvaux, Five Books on Consideration: Advice to a Pope ,(Kalamazoo: Cistercian
Publications, 1976.), 25-26.
30 Bernard de Clairvaux, De Consideratione, (Romae, Editiones Cistercienses, 1963) Book I, II

28

29

20

Do not trust too much in your present dispositions. Nothing is so fixed in the soul as
not to decay with neglect and time. A scab forms over an old, neglected sore, and as
it becomes insensible, it becomes incurable. Indeed, a constant sharp pain cannot be
born for a long time. If it is not relieved by something external, it must provide its
own relief. It is a fact that it will either obtain relief quickly from a cure or produce
numbness by its own persistence.31
If the wound were to remain recent, remembering the loss of the contemplative life would
be easy. But as we ourselves know the process of injury, and as Bernard reminds Eugenius,
scabs form over wounds. (Though “sore” is used in the Anderson and Kennan translation, it
is still “wound” in the Latin, vulnera.) It will “provide its own relief” if not given its cure,
contemplation. But a curing of the wound is not what Bernard desires for Eugenius. Relief
would come in the form of a cure or numbness. And in both cases, the pain of the wound
would no longer be felt. In order to keep the wound open, Eugenius must provide some of
the external cure that he so ardently desires, but not give himself over completely to
contemplation. Bernard wants Eugenius to take time to satisfy his desire for contemplation
despite the demands of the papal office, so as not to forget his intense love of
contemplation. The intensity and intimacy of this metaphor is no accident.
Bernard continues to characterize the ideal relationship to contemplation through a
desire for Rachel, using Rachel and Leah as figures for the active life and contemplative life:
Invitus, ni fallor, avelleris a tuae Rachelis amplexibus, et quoties id pati contigerit,
toties dolor tuus renovetur necesse est. At quando non contingit?32
Unless I am wrong, you are taken away from the embrace of your Rachel against
your will, and as many times you experience suffering, your grief will necessarily be
renewed. But when do you not experience it?33
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Eugenius has been torn away from the amplexibus or the embrace or even caress of his
Rachel. This indulgence is obviously intimate in nature, and purposely so. Contemplation is
an intimate act. It must be lusted after, (“How often do you desire her, but in vain?”)34 in the
same way that Jacob lusts after Rachel for another seven years before he can marry her.
The use of Rachel to convey a sense of desire and the wound to convey pain, at first,
may seem contradictory. But both are intimate and work together in order to define what
Bernard sees as perhaps the most important characteristic of the contemplative life: a
desire for it so intense that it is painful. The metaphor of the wound combined with that of
the lust for Rachel shows Eugenius that the pining after the contemplative life must remain
that intense. The wound must remain open; the intense pain characterizing how burning
his desire is for Rachel. The intensity, this pain, is key to keeping a contemplative life.
Eugenius should not let the wound heal so as to let him forget about his need for
contemplation. The most dangerous outcome of this loss would be for this wound to scab
over, the result being callousness toward his former love. “Ita paulatim in cordis duritiam
itur, et ex illa in aversionem.”35 Little, by little, his heart hardening over time, which would
lead him to, as it says in the Latin literally turn away. More figuratively, it is a loss of faith,
“apostasy,” as interpreted by Anderson and Kennan. He will no longer lust. His heart will
harden.
What would be the result of a hardness of heart? In the most extreme sense, it seems
a loss of contemplation, even a loss of faith. One would lose oneself in the affairs of men,
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and lose sight of God. For someone who was chosen to lead a people into a life of salvation,
it would be a dangerous fate indeed. The passage that opens this chapter appears here:
…laudo humanitatem, sed si plena sit. Quomodo autem plena, te excluso? Et tu homo
es. Ergo ut integra sit et plena humanitas, colligat et te intra se sinus qui omnes
recipit. Alioquin quid tibi prodest, iuxta verbum Domini, si universos lucreris, te
unum perdens?36
I praise your devotion to mankind, but only if it is complete. Now, how can it be
complete when you have excluded yourself? You too are a man. For your devotion
to be whole and complete, let yourself be gathered into that bosom that receives
everyone. Otherwise, as the Lord says, ‘What does it profit you to gain the whole
world, but lose yourself alone?’37

In his devotion to humanity, Eugenius cannot forget himself. Bernard aptly writes, “Et tu
homo es,” he too is a man. He must come together in the sinus, the “bosom,” “embrace,” or
even the “intimacy”38 that accepts all of humanity, the love of God, which he too deserves
through the act of contemplation. Otherwise, gaining access to the entire universe means
nothing in the face of losing his one self in the process.
While On Consideration was surely read by more people than just Pope Eugenius III,
it was written with the pope as the specific audience. Bernard’s On the Song of Songs, is
filled with sermons widely read and used by many. In this work, there is an application of
the contemplation and action dichotomy for lives of monks whose tensions of active and
contemplative are less clear. Bernard sought to make the division more apparent and even
to explain how the two faculties work together in the lives of holy men. He writes,
It is characteristic of true and pure contemplation that when the mind is ardently
aglow with God's love, it is sometimes so filled with zeal and the desire to gather to
36
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God those who will love him with equal abandon that it gladly foregoes
contemplative leisure for the endeavor of preaching. 39
It is as if Bernard is offering explanation or a sort of consoling for those who find their days
filled with preaching and duties of the active life. People who are active often find
themselves that way because they must share the love and excitement for God that they
have gained through contemplation. He goes on,
And then, with its desire at least partially satisfied, it returns to its leisure with an
eagerness proportionate to its successful interruption, until, refreshed again with
the food of contemplation, it hastens to add to its conquests with renewed strength
and experienced zeal. 40
The relationship continues to go in cycles, with contemplation feeding a zeal for active
duties, but active duties forcing the person back into contemplation once a desire for the
active life has been satisfied. This constant change could be confusing or disruptive to the
sort of contemplative life that Bernard illustrated for us so passionately in On
Consideration. He addresses this consistent state of flux here:
Quite often though the mind is tossed to and fro amid these changes, fearful and
violently agitated lest it cling more than is justified to one or the other of these rival
attractions and so deviate from God's will even momentarily. Perhaps holy Job
endured this when he said: 'When I lie down I say, "when shall I arise?" And then I
look forward to the evening.' That is, when at prayer I accuse myself of indifference
at work; when at work of upsetting my prayer. You see here a holy man violently
tossed between the fruit of action and the quiet of contemplation: through all the
time involved in what is good he is ever repenting of imaginary sins, every moment
seeking for the will of God with tears. 41
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Bernard admits that these violent and frequent changes do create unrest. And that amidst
this tossing, it is difficult to choose the sort of life one ought to cling to. Understanding this,
he offers a solution:
For this man the only remedy, the last resort, is prayer and frequent appeals to God
that He would deign to show us unceasingly what he wishes us to do, at what time,
and in what measure. In the three words here designated and commended you have,
I think, these three things: Preaching, prayer and contemplation.42
Bernard tells his eager audience that prayer is the only solution for “this man” who is
tossed about in the waves of action and contemplation. God will give guidance to what he
should pay his attention to and when. Preaching is the active realm of his life,
contemplation obviously the contemplative, and prayer used to distinguish where he
should turn his attention.
But who is “this man” that Bernard places in this turbulent scenario?
Surely his audience of monks of the order could relate, anyone may have struggled with
this. However, it would not be unlikely for this advice to be taken from his own experience.
Pope Eugenius was not the first or last important person Bernard gave counsel to. Bernard
was called upon from many different eminent men of high religious rank for advice and
wisdom. And for a man living in the twelfth century, he traveled extensively around
Europe to preach the second crusade, spoke out against heretics, and became heavily
involved in various papal affairs. Here are just a few examples: in 1128, he was present and
assisted Pope Honorius II in the council of Troyes. It was here that he was instrumental in
the founding of the Knights Templar. He became involved in the schism between popes in
1130, ultimately favoring Innocent II and traveling with him around Italy in 1132. In 1140,
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at the council of Sense, Bernard had his famed confrontation with Abelard, calling him a
heretic, a monk only in habit and name, nothing else.43 And in 1146, Bernard preached the
second crusade in Burgundy and took off on a mission to continue that preaching in
Germany. He ultimately returned in France to involve himself in the condemnation Gilbert
de la Porrée in 1147. Bernard’s life was anything but cloistered. He was one of the most
renowned thinkers of his day, as a result of his traveling and preaching. Compared to the
many who heard these sermons, Bernard traveled not only far more than the average
monk, but also more than most secular people. How then, do we listen to his advice? Does
this throw into doubt the intense focus on contemplation that Bernard triumphed, if he
himself spent most of his life devoted to action?
It would be absurd to say that Bernard did not mean what he wrote and even more
so to call him a hypocrite. With all of his active work, Bernard himself had his own wound.
He must have felt the intense desire for Rachel, missing contemplation from his life. The
writings themselves are not dishonest. Bernard actually acknowledges the oddity of his
extremely active life, calling himself a monster.
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Clamat ad vos mea monstruosa vita, mea aerumnosa conscientia. Ergo enim quaedam
Chimaerea mei saeculi, nec clericum gero nec laicum. Nam monarchi iamdudum exui
conversationem, non habitum.44
My monstrous life and my troubled conscious call out to you. Because I am the
chimera of my age, I play neither a clerk nor a layman. For long ago, I cast off the
association, and habit of a monk.
In calling his life monstrous, Bernard did not mean something sinister or frightening, but a
combination of forms. Christ is often referred to a monstrous, in his combination of human
and divine. Specifically, Bernard calls himself a “chimera,” a mythological beast that has the
head of a lion, the head of a goat, and a tail of a snake. Meaning, he does not have a singular
identity or form, he is not a laymen or clerk. He does not say this, but nor is he a secular
ruler nor a man of the papal office. Yet, he takes on some duties from each of these roles
while abandoning other parts of them. He elaborates in the following line that he long ago,
cast off the conversationem and habitum of a monk. Bernard admits that he himself no
longer lives the lifestyle that he preaches, and has not for some time. This does mean his
writings on the contemplative life are apocryphal. Quite the contrary, this aerumnosa
conscientia, shows us Bernard’s own wound, and pining for the contemplative life gone
from him. But despite his vicarious writings, which urged others to relish the
contemplative life, the perception of Bernard’s life’s work had the reverse influence. The
influence of the figure of Bernard brought about a pressure on this dichotomy of the active
and contemplative. Though he sought to preach the benefits and preference that should be
given to the cloistered and contemplative life, his preaching and traveling showed a very
different sort of life. Whether he intended to, or not, Bernard became the ideal.
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Cathedral Schools and The Rise of the University
Great thinkers traveling from place to place, seeking knowledge existed before
Bernard. Abelard considered himself to be one of these philosophers. But after Bernard’s
many travels and preaching, the phenomenon of wandering scholars only increased. They
were not yet at universities, but they were far from their cloisters. These men would travel
about, often forming a sort of motley crew, learning from whomever they pleased. One
group out of this tradition worth mentioning is the “Goliards” of the late twelfth century,
who wandered about finding their home in the cathedrals that would take them in. They
were criticized by many as vagabonds, though collectively are attributed to the great work,
Carmina Burana. Despite the criticisms they received, others would follow their and others’
examples. More and more people, who formerly would live a cloistered life in a small feudal
town, were making their way to these big cities where major cathedrals were located. 45 Le
Goff gives a description of them:
Those poor students who had no fixed home, who had no prebend, no stipend, thus
set out on an intellectual adventure, following the master who pleased them at the
moment. They formed the body of that scholastic vagabondage that was also so
characteristic of the twelfth century. They contributed to giving it adventurous,
impulsive, bold appearance. But they did not form a class. Of different origins, they
had different ambitions.46

The influx of these “wandering clerks” brought more diversity to those pursuing an
education. More and more, those setting out for it were pursuing what Le Goff calls here,
“an intellectual adventure.” Or course many of these motives were ultimately religious, and
guided by devotion. But many were not. Part of these teachings, though at first
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controversial, were heavily dependent on a study of rational thought and dialectics. Much
of this was taken from the classical world. And these teachings were again, not just aimed
at budding theologians, though that continued to be viewed as the highest form of
profession. They would become medical doctors, philosophers, and lawyers by using
education as a means to bring them to the very active desires of their lives.
At the beginning of the thirteenth century, we see the age of the universities, which
subsumed these smaller collectives known as cathedral Schools. The universities, occurring
in cities across Europe, would become the centers of learning and thinking during that
time.47 It was here, in the university, which housed the perhaps best-known example of an
intellectual from the Middle Ages, Saint Thomas Aquinas of the Dominican Order.
The Dominican Order and Thomas Aquinas
But before coming to Aquinas’s life and work, let us consider his context as a
Dominican, and the Dominican Order’s relationship to the Cistercian Order. In 1206, about
half a century after Bernard’s own campaign against heretics, Dominic Guzmán and Diego, a
bishop would join twelve Cistercians in Montpellier to launch a new campaign together,
which preached against heresy. After the campaign ended, Diego and other bishops
departed for posts, and the Cistercians returned to their cloistered monasteries. Dominic,
however, infected with a zeal for the active life, saw no place fit for his work. He continued
his work preaching and traveling, cultivating a tradition in his wake, creating an order of
Friars. This order, which loved preaching and spreading the word of God through teaching,
would come to be known as the Dominican Order.
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This is the tradition that Aquinas comes out of. And it is through his life and work
that we are able to see what has become of contemplation, in its relationship to the active
and public life of university scholars. Aquinas was and is still viewed as the most holy and
good of men. He taught many, and produced an outstanding amount of work that is still
read extensively today by members of the Catholic Church. The following is not to say he
was not religious, or deeply devoted to God. It is instead a complication of his own
relationship with contemplation as a result of his surroundings and his work.
Aquinas was a renowned teacher, his preaching quite notable. He was not as selfconfident as Abelard, nor did he travel as much as either Abelard or Bernard. But he did
teach extensively, and moved many as it is told in his Vita. Frequent preaching was
required of him in the university, preaching becoming a major part of his life. Teaching, he
explains to be part of the active life though informed by contemplation, as Bernard did:
Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., activa vita est panem esurienti
tribuere, verbo sapientiae nescientem docere.
Respondeo dicendum quod actus doctrinae habet duplex obiectum, fit enim doctrina
per locutionem; locutio autem est signum audibile interioris conceptus. Est igitur
unum obiectum doctrinae id quod est materia sive obiectum interioris conceptionis.
Et quantum ad hoc obiectum, quandoque doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam,
quandoque ad contemplativam, ad activam quidem, quando homo interius concipit
aliquam veritatem ut per eam in exteriori actione dirigatur; ad contemplativam
autem, quando homo interius concipit aliquam veritatem intelligibilem in cuius
consideratione et amore delectatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis Dom.,
eligant sibi partem meliorem, scilicet vitae contemplativae; vacent verbo, inhient
doctrinae dulcedini, occupentur circa scientiam salutarem, ubi manifeste dicit
doctrinam ad vitam contemplativam pertinere. Aliud vero obiectum doctrinae est ex
parte sermonis audibilis. Et sic obiectum doctrinae est ipse audiens. Et quantum ad
hoc obiectum, omnis doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam, ad quam pertinent
exteriores actiones.48
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On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life is to
give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of wisdom."
I answer that, The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching is conveyed by
speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior concept. Accordingly one object
of teaching is the matter or object of the interior concept; and as to this object
teaching belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It
belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be
directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the contemplative life when
a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof he
delights. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for
themselves the better part," namely the contemplative life, "let them be busy with
the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves
with salutary knowledge," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the
contemplative life. The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard,
and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all doctrine belongs to
the active life to which external actions pertain.49
Here, Aquinas clearly acknowledges the better of the two to be the contemplative life. And
while speech and teaching are clearly part of the active life, they are informed by
contemplation: “speech is the audible sign of interior concept.” When a truth is put forth
outwardly, it is there that is becomes part of the active life. And it is not just speech, or
preaching that corresponds to the active life, but doctrine and other writings as well.
(Omnis doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam, “all doctrine pertains to the active life.”) Aquinas
was one of the most prolific scholars. His writings were quickly accepted as doctrine and
incorporated into Catholicism’s teachings. According to his Vita, Aquinas was so prolific
that he needed three secretaries to handle the amount of writing which was required of the
large amount he dictated. In the context of his own writing, Aquinas understood his prolific
writing to be a result of his continuous contemplation. And while Aquinas himself
understood this, it is unclear if his students or others did. Those admiring or learning from
49 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas, literally translated by Fathers of the English
Dominican Provence, (Second and Revised Edition, 1920) online edition translated by Kevin Knight (Online
edition copyright 2008) accessed December 2nd, 2013, http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3181.htm
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him would only be privy to his active life as a preacher and a prolific scholar. Much like
Bernard, whether or not he intended such a result, Aquinas influenced the way in which
one should live as both a prolific public intellectual and a man of high religious rank.
Bernard saw himself as the exception to those he lived amongst, a monster. But his
reception created him into the ideal. Aquinas did not think himself a monster. And as a
result the reception of him was not to view him as an exception, or an ideal, but the rule of
how one ought to conduct oneself. The emphasis moved strongly to preaching and writing
extensively, shifting the emphasis from the contemplative life to that of the active.
The beginnings of this loss are small, but nonetheless integral to an understanding
of the continued status of contemplation as something often subordinated to the active life.
We see the wound, even here. If Arendt is right, in deeming contemplation now as
“meaningless,” then we have gained the universe and lost ourselves in the process. We
would then move away from what was formerly a wound, to behold the scars that we
inherited over time. Perhaps, however, she is wrong, and our open wound somewhere
remains. If this is the case, where is contemplation? Amidst the chaos of new education
reforms that cater to the demands of the public world, how can contemplation sustain
itself? How can the wound remain open? In the next chapter, we go back to antiquity, to the
age of Cicero, where explicit writings on contemplation are not available. In Rome’s
publicly-driven society, which is not unlike our own publicity-obsessed culture,
contemplation is seemingly difficult to find. Despite this difficulty, the next chapter aims to
find ways to locate contemplation or the desire for it, amidst the very active Rome
Republic.
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II. Finding Contemplation Through Cicero

“ Nihil mihi nunc scito tam deesse uam hominem eum, quocum omnia, que me cura aliqua
adficiunt, uno communicem, qui me amet, qui sapiat, quicum ego cum loquar, nihil fingam,
nihil dissimulem, nihil obtegam.”50
Marcus Tullius Cicero, Ad Atticum, 1.18

In a letter to his dear friend, Titus Pomponius Atticus, Marcus Tullius Cicero pleads
for his friend to come home to Rome from Athens. He explains with urgency that he needs a
hominem, a wise person who cares for him deeply, a close friend to speak to without
pretense about what vexes him most. At this moment, Cicero calls out to his confidant,
Atticus, just as Bernard or Aquinas might call to God for counsel while contemplating.
Though explicit mentions of contemplation in Rome are absent, this chapter seeks to find
moments of contemplation in the life of Cicero, illuminating places we might look to find
contemplation in our own era. Arendt discusses Greek Antiquity in depth in her work,- but
focuses much less on Rome.51 Here, I focus on Rome both to illuminate distinctions missed
by her and to explore the important link that is the Roman republic. Stuck between an age
after Aristotle and before the Middle Ages, the age of Cicero is the vital link between the
birth of contemplation and the medieval culture that would foster the many writings on it.
Through focusing on the distinction between public and private in the Roman Republic,
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I must tell you that what I most badly need at the present moment is a confidantsomeone with whom I could share all that gives me anxiety, a wise friend who cares for me,
to whom I could talk to without any calculation, pretense, or concealment.
51 This may have been due to the nationalistic adoption of the Roman Empire by Mussolini
during Arendt’s lifetime.
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specifically through the lens of Cicero, I argue that contemplation can be found in the more
private life of Cicero, despite the intense focus on public life in Rome.
Publica and Privatis
Necessarily, this project deals with the concepts of public and private life in Rome.
While we may be inclined to make these distinctions stark, Roman life will not comply so
simply. The Latin terms themselves better explicate how these terms should be seen—less
as distinct realms, but as a continuum. Publica literally means belonging to the people. And
privatis, taking its definition from its verb from, privo, is literally translated to mean
something that has been deprived from the people or something robbed from the public.
Using this idea of ownership over all things, but deprivation in some cases, we find
ourselves in varying states of public-ness and privacy. Rather than two clear and separate
definitions, a private space or private sphere is simply one stolen away or deprived of this
public ownership, a continuum of publicness. With this is mind, I move forward to give a
comprehensive idea of how some major aspects of Cicero’s world would have fit into
varying degrees of publicness and privacy. Through his own narrative of his education,
architecture, and texts, I deal with these complexities accordingly to pursue contemplation
in Cicero’s lifetime, the age of the Roman Republic.
Public Identity and Collective in Rome
Marcus Tullius Cicero was born in 106 BC in Arpinum, a town southeast of Rome.52
Cicero did not grow up in the city that he would later spend his life caring for. His father,
not actually being a Roman citizen himself, was not able to participate in politics. He was
If interested in Cicero’s biography further, see Plutarch’s life of Cicero in his Parallel Lives or a
more contemporary biography enjoyed by new students and advanced classicists, Anthony Everitt’s
Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician. New York: Random House, 2001.
52
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still of the notable equestrian class which endowed him with friends in higher places. His
father would push for him to have the sort of education he knew would produce a public
life and public career for Cicero. This would be successful, as Cicero would go on to become
a famed orator, lawyer, and politician. He would hold his first office at quaestor of Sicily,
and the consul in 63 BC. He would later be invited by Julius Caesar to join Gnaeus Pompeius
Magnus (Pompey), Marcus Licinius Crassus (Crassus), and Caesar himself in what would
come to be known as the First Triumvirate. Cicero, suspicious of Caesar’s intentions for the
Republic, would decline. Cicero lived through the dramatic assassination of Julius Caesar, a
plot executed to protect the Republic from the private ambitions of Caesar. This intense
commitment to public life, at whatever cost, underscored the Rome that Cicero lived in. The
following section illuminates how this idea of sacrifice for the collective was imbedded into
the history and ancestry that the Roman Republic would claim proudly as its own.
Stories of Sacrifice in Roman Republic History
Roman life was thought to be a constant negotiation of duties, to family and friends,
but above all to Rome. With this public identity, Romanitas as the supreme concern, much
was required to be sacrificed in its pursuit. This concept, integral to the Republic, begins
with the ousting of the Tarquin Kings, and then leads to a conspiracy against the one who
rid Rome of them, Lucius Junius Brutus. In Book II of his Ab Urber Condita , Livy writes,
Erant in Romana iuventute adulescentes aliquot, nec ii tenui loco orti, quorum in
regno libido solutior fuerat, aequales sodalesque adulescentium Tarquiniorum, adsueti
more regio vivere. Eam tum, aequato iure omnium, licentiam quaerentes, libertatem
aliorum in suam vertisse servitutem inter se conquerebantur: regem hominem esse, a
quo impetres, ubi ius, ubi iniuria opus sit; esse gratiae locum, esse beneficio; et irasci et
ignoscere posse; inter amicum atque inimicum discrimen nosse; 53
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There were some young men of high birth in Rome who during the late reign had
done pretty much what they pleased, and being boon companions of the young
Tarquins were accustomed to live in royal fashion. Now that all were equal before
the law, they missed their former license and complained that the liberty which
others enjoyed had become slavery for them; as long as there was a king, there was
a person from whom they could get what they wanted, whether lawful or not, there
was room for personal influence and kindness, he could show severity or
indulgence, could discriminate between his friends and his enemies.54
These young men, sons of Brutus, accustomed to living by these kings’ standards, come
together to protect their own personal preferences and passions, because to live without
their formal privilege, what they saw as agency, felt like slavery in comparison. This fight
for private interests, like the monarchy, would be thwarted by Brutus. His sons quickly led
themselves into danger. The example of one’s unwavering and absolute dedication to the
Roman Republic comes when these conspirators are caught and punished. Livy writes,
Direptis bonis regum damnati proditores sumptumque supplicium, conspectius eo
quod poenae capiendae ministerium patri de liberis consulatus imposuit, et qui
spectator erat amovendus, eum ipsum fortuna exactorem supplicii dedit. Stabant
deligati ad palum nobilissimi iuvenes; sed a ceteris, velut ab ignotis capitibus, consulis
liberi omnium in se averterant oculos, miserebatque non poenae magis homines quam
sceleris quo poenam meriti essent: illos eo potissimum anno patriam liberatam,
patrem liberatorem, consulatum ortum ex domo Iunia, patres, plebem, quidquid
deorum hominumque Romanorum esset, induxisse in animum ut superbo quondam
regi, tum infesto exsuli proderent. Consules in sedem processere suam, missique
lictores ad sumendum supplicium. Nudatos virgis caedunt securique feriunt, cum inter
omne tempus pater voltusque et os eius spectaculo esset, eminente animo patrio inter
publicae poenae ministerium.55
After the royal property had been disposed of, the traitors were sentenced and
executed. Their punishment created a great sensation owing to the fact that the
consular office imposed upon a father the duty of inflicting punishment on his own
children; he who ought not to have witnessed it was destined to be the one to see it
54 Roberts, Rev. Canon. Livy's History of Rome. Translated with introduction by Rev. Canon Roberts.
London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1905.
55 Livy, Ab Urber Condita, History of Rome, Book 2.5
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duly carried out. Youths belonging to the noblest families were standing tied to the
post, but all eyes were turned to the consul's children, the others were unnoticed.
Men did not grieve more for their punishment than for the crime which had
incurred it-that they should have conceived the idea, in that year above all, of
betraying to one, who had been a ruthless tyrant and was now an exile and an
enemy, a newly liberated country, their father who had liberated it, the consulship
which had originated in the Junian house, the senate, the plebs, all that Rome
possessed of human or divine. The consuls took their seats, the lictors were told off
to inflict the penalty; they scourged their bared backs with rods and then beheaded
them. During the whole time, the father's countenance betrayed his feelings, but the
father's stern resolution was still more apparent as he superintended the public
execution.56

Doing what he deemed necessary for the safety of the new republic, Brutus had his own
sons executed for the sake of Rome’s future. Though the Romans’ values and tolerance of
violence was different than our own, Brutus does not execute his own sons easily. This is a
sacrifice. Livy tells us that Brutus’ voltus betrays this difficulty, but he proceeds to head the
public execution of kin for the safety and sanctity of Rome. This story becomes integral to
the stories of Rome’s foundation. Reference to it can be found in Virgil’s Aeneid, in book VI
when Anchises tells Aeneas of Rome’s future. Virgil writes,
vis et Tarquinios reges animamque superbam
ultoris Bruti, fascisque videre receptos?
consulis imperium hic primus saevasque securis
accipiet, natosque pater nova bella moventis
ad poenam pulchra pro libertate vocabit,
infelix, utcumque ferent ea facta minores:
vincet amor patriae laudumque immensa cupido.57
Wait,
Would you like to see the Tarquin kings, the overweening
Spirit of Brutus the Avenger, the fasces he reclaims?
The first to hold a consul’s power and ruthless axes,
56
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Then, when his sons foment rebellion against the city,
their father summons them to the executioner’s block
in freedom’s noble name, unfortunate man…
however the future years will exalt his actions:
a patriot’s lost wins out, and boundless lust for praise.58

Anchises tells Aeneas of the future of Rome, wherein Brutus calls for the ousting of the
Tarquins, the necessary execution of his sons “pro libertate,” and a founding of the glorious
Republic.59 It is this Lucius Junius Brutus, known to be related to the Marcus Brutus, the
Marcus Brutus who played a central role in the famed conspiracy against Julius Caesar. The
conspirators against Caesar saw a man motivated by his own private concerns and selfinterest. The conspirators assassinated Caesar to protect Rome against tyranny. Plutarch
tells us of so many moments during the plot against Caesar that express this suppression of
private concerns for the public good. Most notably, it is the famed Marcus Brutus who must
endure the constant torment of public and private demands. Just before the assassination,
Brutus’s wife, Porcia, is overcome with anxiety from all that she knows about the
impending events. Plutarch writes in his life of Brutus,
She had not time to betake herself to her chamber, but, sitting as she was amongst
her women, a sudden swoon and a great stupor seized her, and her color changed,
and her speech was quite lost. At this sight her women made a loud cry, and many of
the neighbors running to Brutus's door to know what was the matter, the report
was soon spread abroad that Porcia was dead; though with her women's help she
recovered in a little while, and came to herself again. When Brutus received this
news, he was extremely troubled, not without reason, yet was not so carried away
by his private grief as to quit his public purpose.60
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Hearing the news that his wife may in fact be so ill she is close to death, Brutus presses on
because of the public necessity. But like his ancestor, Lucius Junius Brutus, this was indeed
a sacrifice of personal attachments, one not easy to make. Both were saddened and
troubled by the choice they had to make. But in both cases, nothing could stand in the way
of public need, and both carried on. For the subjugation of private motivations of the glory
that is Rome was integral to Rome’s foundation and beginnings, this sentiment carried
through to the Republic.
Cicero’s Education for a Public Life
As mentioned earlier, Cicero’s father would ensure that Cicero received the sort of
education which would prepare him for a successful public life in Rome. Scholarship on his
education is often based solely on the text of his speech, Pro Archia. Delivered as the
defense of a Greek poet and Cicero’s tutor, Archias, whose claim to Roman citizenship was
in question, the speech also contains reflection on the education that Cicero himself
received. Cicero writes,
Quam multas nobis imagines--non solum ad intuendum, verum etiam ad
imitandum--fortissimorum virorum expressas scriptores et Graeci et Latini
reliquerunt? Quas ego mihi semper in administranda re publica proponens animum
et mentem meam ipsa cognitatione hominum excellentium conformabam… Quod si
non his tantus fructus ostenderetur, et si ex his studiis delectatio sola peteretur,
tamen (ut opinor) hanc animi humanissimam ac liberalissimam iudicaretis.61
How many images of the noble men, carefully recorded, have both the Greek and
Latin writers left to us, not solely for us to look at, but also to imitate? And always
putting these before me while I guide the public state, I modeled my own spirit and
mind after the very thought of these excellent men.
… Even if there was no great fruit to be reaped from them, and they were only used
for pleasure, nevertheless, it is in my opinion that you would judge them to be the
most human and free ways to stretch the mind.
61
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Cicero here is defending the practical purpose of the kind of education he received from
Archias. This guidance in public affairs is later referred to as the fructus of these pursuits, in
contrast to the less practical or pleasure that are derived from them. While considered
“practical,” in that it prepared for public life, this education consisted primarily of Greek
poetry and literature, quite different from our own notions of practicality. This idea of
practicality is defined in contrast with Greece’s educational philosophy, in its
“impracticality, ” studying for the pursuit of wisdom and learning for learning’s sake.
Though they may have consisted of the same texts and myths, each culture’s outlook on the
function of education was different in this tension of practicality versus impracticality.
Cicero would go on to harness the practical benefits that this sort of education would bring
him as a successful orator, modeling himself after the brave and great men he read about
during his schooling. In the time of the Republic, if you were the first in your family to serve
on the Senate and participate in public life then you were considered a novus homo.62
Cicero’s father, with high hopes for his son and well-off friends to tip him off, was sure to
get his son the sort of education that would lead to public life in Rome. Clearly a success,
Cicero would go on to participate in a variety of public affairs as stated earlier, including
receiving a consulship. Cicero took full advantage of the practical benefits, but his
62
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education also brought him other benefits, which were less public and more private in
nature. These more personal fruits of education, those in which contemplation might be
found, are to be elaborated on after a brief understanding the public and privateness of
spaces in Rome.
Public and Private Spheres in Rome
Before delving further into Cicero’s life, specifically his intimate relationship with
Atticus, we must understand the spatial context of public and private spaces in Rome. Much
of the scholarship done on public and private life in Antiquity is in reference to spatial
places. In the passage cited in the following section, from the Pro Archia, Cicero references
public life using the term foris. Translated as “in public” or in the “forum” by some, it has
the literal meaning of a door or gate, the implication being that public life happens out of
the doorway, out of the home. While simplistically, this may be true, many of the functions
of the homes of Roman politicians were not so protected or private. Transactions with
clients as well as entertaining of political connections would occur at the home. There
would often be as many as three entrance gates to a domus.63 The smaller of the gates
would often provide the sort of literal and figurative barrier from public life, being the
gates you might enter and leave every day from your home. But a larger gate, the main
entrance of the property would be opened to signify the master’s readiness to take guests.
Outer portions of the domus were for these types of visitors. Often it would be opened in
the morning to signify a master’s willingness to take his clients’ offerings and tributes. After
entering through the gate, one would find oneself in the vestibule. While part of the home
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proper, it acted as transitionary space where one would still be subject to a critical eye. If
one were to make it past the vestibule and into the hall, one might have been a guest
considered of some prestige, at least higher than a client.64 Perhaps invited for a dinner
party or were political friends visiting with a proposition, in these cases and more, one
might find oneself in the hall or the peristyle65 of the home. Thereof course were spaces
that were not open to public or visitors, usually bedrooms located away from these more
public and transitional spaces of the domus. Even the home, which is often set up in
contrast to the forum, is rather public by our own standards. It seems strange, but unlike
ourselves, or even the medieval people—Romans were rarely alone. Most activities were
done with others. Thus, personal moments might not have to occur necessarily in solitude,
but in some smaller contrast to the immensely and wholly public world of the forum.
Privacy and contemplation might still occur with others present, it just depended on who
these individuals were. In a letter begging his dear friend Atticus to come home, Cicero
writes,
Ita sum ab omnibus destitutus. ut tantum requietis habeam, quantum cum uxore et
filiola et mellito Cicerone consumitur. Nam illae ambitiosae nostrae fucosaeque
amicitiae sunt in quodam splendore forensi, fructum domesticum non habent.
Itaque, cum bene completa domus est tempore matutino, cum ad forum stipati
gregibus amicorum descendimus, reperire ex magna turba neminem possumus,
quocum aut iocari libere aut suspirare familiariter possimus. 66
I am so utterly forsaken that all my moments of relaxation are those I spend with my
wife, my little daughter, and my darling Marcus. My brilliant worldly friendships
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might make a fine show in public, but in the home they are barren things. My house
is crammed for a morning, I go down to the forum surrounded by droves of friends,
but in all the multitude I cannot find one with whom I can pass an unguarded joke or
fetch a private sigh.67
The home, despite being less public than the forum, is no more comforting to Cicero here.
Cicero’s family and political friendships are no substitutes for the comfort and familiarity
that Atticus provides. It is this friendship, more than physical space, which carves out
privacy for Cicero’s privacy and personal contemplation.
Friendship
Much is written on Rome’s emphasis on public life and the importance of sacrifice
for the good of the collective. But what must be sacrificed in its wake? Other than selfinterest, what is sacrificed? Familial and marital relations, these relations that exist in the
more private realm of the home, are part of this private sector. But as seen with Brutus,
these will be sacrificed in time of need. I am hesitant to reduce the private lives of this
publically minded society to so little as family and political ambition. Where then, could
private life, or even contemplation exist? I argue that friendship in Roman antiquity,
specifically for Cicero, is able to sustain and nourish a private life, giving space for
contemplation.
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Cicero defines friendship as existing only in good men. This is not at all unlike the
definition that Aristotle gives in the Nicomachean Ethics.68 It is very likely that Cicero was
familiar with this work that treated friendship as the fruition of a life of Virtue. Cicero’s
own relation to friendship can be seen in the extensive record of letters kept between his
lifelong friend Atticus, and himself. We will look to those later. Cicero also writes directly
on friendship in his De Amicitia. Dedicated to Atticus, the dialogue outlines the importance
of friendship and its necessary defining characteristics. Much of the text is concerned
wherein friendship cannot exist (between un-virtuous men, where vice is present, etc.). In
order to give context to Cicero’s actual practice of friendship in his letters, it is imperative
to look to De Amicitia. In the beginning of the text, Cicero writes,
ego vos hortari tantum possum ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis;
nihil est enim tam naturae aptum, tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel
adversas.69
All I can do is exhort you to rank friendship above all other things in human life.
There is nothing so natural, nothing so beneficial, either in favorable or unfavorable
circumstances.70
The high esteem that Cicero holds friendship is evident here, and is carried through a
similar tone in the rest of the text. Cicero is also concerned with showing not just the
importance of friendship, but also its distinctiveness relative to other associations.
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Sic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos esse nos ut inter omnes esset societas
quaedam, maior autem ut quisque proxime accederet. Itaque cives potiores quam
peregrini, propinqui quam alieni…
Indeed it is clear to me that we are born into the world with a certain natural bond
of association between all of us, but a greater one according as we are placed nearer
to each other: fellow countrymen are closer than foreigners, and relatives closer
than strangers. 71

This portion of Cicero’s definition is particularly nuanced, something not included in
Aristotle, and perhaps more specific to Rome. This is his support for the strength of
friendship. It begins with the obvious: fellow Romans are closer than foreigners, due to
commonalities and distance. And blood relatives are obviously closer than strangers. But
Cicero goes on to say that friendship is stronger than all three.

cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit; sed ea non satis habet firmitatis.
Namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benevolentia
tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benevolentia amicitiae nomen
tollitur, propinquitatis manet. Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc intellegi
maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa
natura, ita contracta res est et adducta in angustum ut omnis caritas aut inter duos
aut inter paucos iungeretur.72

With these, nature itself has created a bond of friendship…but not with sufficient
stability; for friendship itself is greater than family connections, in that the latter can
exist without goodwill, but not the former. If goodwill is taken away from the name
of friendship disappears, but that of the family relationship still remains. 73
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Friendship is stronger even than family bonds, which are naturally established, because of
the presence of goodwill. This goodness or virtuousness, which is required of friendship, is
not required of these other relations. One is related to one’s fellow Roman through your
citizenship alone, not your goodness of character. It is with this goodwill, and the natural
bond that we have amongst all humans, Cicero asserts, that makes friendship most strong.
Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc intellegi maxime potest, quod ex infinita
societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est et
adducta in angustum ut omnis caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur.74

However the best way to realize the power of friendship is to understand this, that
out of the infinitely large association of the human race, which nature itself brought
together, friendship is something so concentrated and brought down into a small
narrow space that every instance of real affection exists either between two people,
or a small number. 75

Cicero asserts that there is relation in the association of the human race; we do have
association and connection despite our magnitude. Friendship should be thought of as the
concentrated version of our human bond, into a smaller and more intense relation, and
buttressed by goodness. These definitions of friendship, which show its importance to
Cicero, again, are taken from the De Amicitia, a work of philosophy that Cicero intended to
be read by many. Due to the nature of this project, we must acknowledge the publicness of
this work in contrast to some of the more private works, such as Cicero’s letters, which we
turn to next.
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On Letters
Before moving to the subjects of Cicero’s letters, we must consider letters and their
complex place in the spectrum of public and private life in antiquity. Though they serve
more personal purposes than speeches, we must resist the impulse to designate them
purely as private. And while less public than speeches, they are unlike the personal emails
or text messages one might exchange with a friend today. First, the mode of deliverance
was not so protected. The letters were of course, hand delivered. Their form of postal
service was much less secure than our own. Cicero might ask a neighbor if he was sending a
slave to Athens soon and send a letter with the slave. Wax seals were often in place too,
which provided some security. This uncertainty of arrival and possibility of interception
was not unknown to Cicero.76 Even if this information were relayed privately and secretly,
his letters were not private for long. Soon after his death, they were published in volumes.
Some scholars maintain that some of the volumes may have been published in his own life
time—and that Atticus was the accomplice in much of this.77 This certainly complicates the
place of letters as potentially private.
Nevertheless, in contrast to the overt publicness of speeches and political life,
letters, especially those between Cicero and Atticus, are often different because of their
subject matter that does not appear in speeches. Atticus and Cicero became friends during
their early boyhood schooling and remained so throughout their lives, though most of this
76
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friendship was through letters. While Cicero led a public and political life in Rome, Atticus
left for Athens to pursue his studies in Epicureanism. He would make visits to Rome, but he
resided away from Cicero for most of his life. Despite their differences in life paths, the
friends had great respect for one another, and their intimacy is evident from their letters.78
Their letters discuss a variety of things; Political advice and suspicions are included but
they are discussed with regard to feelings, emotions, anxieties, which do not appear in
speeches. Perhaps the subject that is most moving in the letters is the evidence of
friendship between Cicero and Atticus, and the contrast of this relationship to other
relationship in Cicero’s life. Cicero writes here to Atticus,
Nihil mihi nunc scito tam deesse uam hominem eum, quocum omnia, que me cura
aliqua adficiunt, uno communicem, qui me amet, qui sapiat, quicum ego cum loquar,
nihil fingam, nihil dissimulem, nihil obtegam. Abest enim frater aphelestatos et
amantissimus. Metellus non homo, sed "litus atque aer et solitudo mera." Tu autem,
qui saepissime curam et angorem animi mei sermone et consilio levasti tuo, qui mihi
et in publica re socius et in privatis omnibus conscius et omnium meorum
sermonum et consiliorum particeps esse soles, ubinam es? Quare te exspectamus, te
desideramus, te iam etiam arcessimus. Multa sunt enim, quae me sollicitant
anguntque; quae mihi videor aures nactus tuas unius ambulationis sermone
exhaurire posse.79
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I must tell you that what I most badly need at the present time is a confidantsomeone with whom I could share all that gives me anxiety, a wise
affectionate friend to whom I could talk without pretense or evasion or
concealment. My brother, the soul of candor and affection, is away. [* is not a
person at all – ‘sea shore and air’ and ‘mere solitude.’]And you whose talk
and advice has so lightened my worry and vexation of spirit, the partner in
my public life and intimate of all my private concerns, the sharer of all my
talk and plans, where are you? … I go down to the forum surrounded by
droves of friends, but in all the multitude I cannot find one with whom I can
pass an unguarded joke or fetch a private sigh. That is why I am writing and
longing for you, why I fairly summon you home. There are many things to
worry and vex me, but once I have you here to listen I feel I can pour them all
away in a single walk and talk.80
This does not conflict with the definitions that Cicero gives, but it certainly shows a more
intimate and personal account of friendship. Atticus is a confidant, while away in Rome,
Cicero calls out to him for guidance, assurance, and respite from public life, much like one
might call out to God in contemplation the medieval world. This is not so different than the
personal benefits that Cicero insists one would receive from education that are apart from
the practical fruits he makes reference to in the passage quoted earlier from the Pro Archia.
Again, here is the passage that opened the chapter, Cicero writes,
Nam ceterae neque temporum sunt neque aetatum omnium neque locorum: haec
studia adulescentiam alunt, senectutem oblectant, secundas res ornant, adversis
perfugium ac solacium praebent, delectant domi, non impediunt foris, pernoctant
nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur. 81
For other studies are not fitting to very time, nor for all ages nor all places; these
studies sharpen the youth while diverting the moroseness of old age, they make
prosperous events even better yet also offer refuge and comfort from adversity, they
feel like home but don’t hinder us in the public, they pass the night with us,
accompany us on our travels, and offer the escape of the country.
80
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Cicero desires relaxation from public duties and the alleviation of personal vexing through
Atticus, in the same way that the study of literature can provide comfort in adversity.
Atticus could easily be a part of the public sphere, standing with Cicero in a crowd, as
confidant amongst the multitudes, in the same way that literature would not impediunt
foris. In times when one might be alone, or desire solitude, a rare phenomenon in Rome, it
is your friend or literature that keeps you company and passes the night with you,
traditionally one of the few places of privacy.82 If we were to look for contemplation in
Roman antiquity, this is the place it would exist. As Aristotle defines contemplation, it is
best done amongst friends. And as it comes to be known in the medieval world, it provides
personal relief and respite from the active life, while also making a successful active life
possible through contemplation’s inspiration and respite. In another letter to Atticus,
Cicero writes,
postremo non labor meus, non requies, non negotium, non otium, non forenses
res,non domesticae,nonpublicae, non privatae carere diutius tuo suavissimo atque
amantissimo consilio ac sermone possunt.atque harum rerum commemorationem v
erecundia saepe impedivit utriusque nostrum; nunc autem ea fuit necessaria propte
r eam partemepistulae tuae, per quam te ac mores tuos mihi purgatos ac probatos es
se voluisti.83
In short, whether working or resting, in business or in leisure, in professional or
domestic affairs, in public life or private, I cannot for any length of time do without
your affectionate advice and delight of your conversation. Delicacy has often kept
you and me from putting these things into words, as it has now been necessary to do
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because of the passage in your letter which you have set out to justify yourself and
your manner of life to me.84
In this passage from a letter which Cicero reassures Atticus of his respect and value in his
life, Cicero writes that none of his work or leisure would be possible without the counsel
and conversation from Atticus. The rhetoric here is remarkably similar to that of the first
passage quoted in this chapter from the Pro Archia, illustrating the need that Cicero has for
something intimate to span all spheres of his life, giving him something for all that he does
to thrive on. Just as the medieval scholar seeks counsel from God during hours of
contemplation in order that he might recuperate from active duty, so does Cicero look to
Atticus for something identical in their friendship.
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III: Expanding Arendt’s Definition of Contemplation
for a Secular World
“…Secularization, the modern loss of faith inevitably arising from Cartesian doubt,
deprived individual life of its immortality, or at least of the certainty of immortality.
Individual life again became mortal, as mortal as it had been in antiquity, and the
world was even less stable, less permanent, and hence less to be relied upon than it
had been during the Christian era.”85
- Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition

Secular, saeculum in Latin, is used to denote worldliness. In the bible, it refers to
belonging to an age of mortal men, αἰάζω in Greek. Hannah Arendt calls the modern world
secular, in so much as man realizes himself as one of the world, ripped apart from his
individual immortality.86 Having nothing left except this world, Arendt asserts that man’s
only concern is the immortality of his species. The individual takes solace in the future
existence of his own kind, focusing on the preservation of life and the continuation of the
human race. Man’s valuing of biological life fosters constant concern for the making and
producing of things that protect the existence of the human race, creating a life of action.
Through this focus on vita activa, Arendt asserts that we lost vita contemplativa in the
process. Going as far to declare it “meaningless,” she writes,
If we compare the modern world with that of the past, the loss of human experience
involved in this development is extraordinarily striking. It is… contemplation, which
has become an entirely meaningless experience.87

Given the robust tradition of contemplation in Western thought, Arendt’s diagnosis is
startling. Is it really possible for contemplation, vita contemplativa, to hold no meaning in
85
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our world? Arendt would of course say yes, insisting our focus has shifted to the active life
in the secular world rather than that of the contemplative. The concept of vita activa88
drives the content and method of the work, steering the reader into three sections. Labor,
Work, and Action are the categories that Arendt insists make up the vita activa. Her
culminating thesis in her book shows a victory of the animal laborans, a victory of labor89
over action. Meaning, humanity’s chief focus is on activities and processes that create and
preserve life, not on their immortal futures as individuals. This becomes translated to a
focus on mortal life, rather than immortality. This secular world is where Arendt insists
contemplation has become meaningless. By expanding the definition of contemplation, I
contend that not only does contemplation exist in our secular world, but could once again
be an activity of great value.
Arendt’s Definition of Contemplation
Arendt characterizes contemplation as a pursuit of Truth that is done in solitude,
inactively. More specifically, she discusses what she recognizes as two possible definitions
of contemplation. The first is a “shocked wonder at the miracle of human Being,”90 the
classical definition. But Arendt points to a second definition as predominant, what she
recognizes as the medieval definition. Arendt writes,
In the tradition of philosophy, it is this second kind of contemplation that became
the predominant one… the motionlessness which in the state of speechless wonder
is no more than an incidental, unintended result of absorption, becomes now the
condition and hence the outstanding characteristic of the vita contemplativa. It is not
88
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wonder that overcomes and throws man into motionlessness, but it is through the
conscious cessation of activity, the activity of making, that the contemplative state is
reached. If one reads medieval sources on the joys and delights of contemplation, it
is as though the philosophers wanted to make sure that homofaber would heed the
call and let his arms drop, finally realizing that his greatest desire, the desire for
permanence and immortality, cannot be fulfilled by his doings, but only when he
realizes that the beautiful and eternal cannot be made.91

When discussing contemplation and its defining characteristics, Arendt uses Thomas
Aquinas as her sole source. 92 Knowing this, it is likely that Arendt’s definition was also
influenced by Aquinas’s famous writings on the beatific vision. Arendt writes that the
“contemplative state” is reached through cessation, a throwing oneself into motionlessness.
This “state” that Arendt describes is remarkably similar to the beatific vision known from
both Aquinas and Dante, the immediate knowledge of God, characterized by motionless
awe. When Dante, at the end of Paradiso, beholds the light and power of God, he is still after
the long journey, struck motionless by awe. 93 It is a moment defined by Aquinas as “perfect
happiness,” to happen fully in the afterlife at the moment when viewing God, communing in
his essence.94 These are the writings and images that supply Arendt with her medieval
definition of contemplation. This is the contemplation that she declares “meaningless” in
the modern age in The Human Condition. She argues, based on the definition illustrated
above, that the contemplative life has become subordinated to the active life, and then
proceeds to focus on exploring the defining features of the vita activa.
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Arendt’s Argument
Arendt defines vita activa by splitting it into three separate distinctions: Labor,
Work and Action. Calling contemplation meaningless brings Arendt to believe in a world
that focuses purely on vita activa. And because Western thought before this point put
enormous focus on vita contemplativa, her project seeks to define and explore distinctions
made within that of the vita activa.95 My issue comes with the following argument, which
suggests a complete loss of contemplation.
Arendt proposes that since the seventeenth-century, there has been a “reversal of
the hierarchical order between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa.”96 With the rise of
modern science practices, contemplation has become subordinated. Arendt writes,
It is a matter of historical record that modern technology has its origins not in the
evolution of those tools man had always devised for the twofold purpose of easing
his labors and erecting the human artifice, but exclusively in an altogether nonpractical search for useless knowledge. Thus, the watch, one of the first modern
instruments, was not invented for purposes of practical life, but exclusively for the
highly "theoretical" purpose of conducting certain experiments with nature. 97

Science exists now as a way to solve practical problems, and often make human life easier,
or more resilient in many cases. For much of Western thought pre-seventeenth-century,
Arendt reminds us this was not the case. Arendt uses the watch as an example; showing us
that perhaps the most practical of instruments was once regarded as the most high-minded
and theoretical. Reflected in the origins of scientific inquiry, the Greeks pursued scientific
studies because they thought they would bring their pursuers closer to Truth. The previous
I do not disagree with her project, or with her distinctions necessarily. Definitions of the active
life are scarce. Arendt’s focus on this and work on the subject is invaluable. I purely disagree with
her willingness to cast off vita contemplativa so quickly.
96 Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. 289.
97 Ibid

95

56
chapter briefly discussed the ways in which Roman education departed from its Greek
predecessor. The Greeks preferred the pursuit of pure knowledge to that of practical
results. Though these investigations might have practical side effects, like the keeping of
time, their original intention was based in pure truth seeking. This is no longer the case.
Especially visible in medicine, experiments are no longer concerned with investigating the
mysteries of the human anatomy to find truth, but to discover practical implications that
may aid others. Arendt furthers this point, saying that this hierarchical switch stemmed
not only from man progressing into a “practical being,” but from his desire to understand
the world through the work of his hands, what Arendt calls action. 98 Man no longer trusted
contemplation to yield nature’s secrets. Arendt writes,
Nothing indeed could be less trustworthy for acquiring knowledge and approaching
truth than passive observation or mere contemplation. In order to be certain one
had to make sure, and in order to know one had to do. Certainty of knowledge could
be reached only under a twofold condition: first, that knowledge concerned only
what one had done him-self—so that its ideal became mathematical knowledge,
where we deal only with self-made entities of the mind—and second, that
knowledge was of such a nature that it could be tested only through more doing. 99
Arendt is particularly fond of the example of the telescope.100 The telescope, made by man,
is able to see things not accessible through contemplation alone. This is what made Galileo
Galilei’s work with the Copernican model so revolutionary. This was not just a new theory,
but fact proven through a man made instrument. A thesis proved through the hands of
man, it had the capability to be proved again and again by anyone who might look through
it. Arendt views this empiricism as dominating, pushing what she sees akin to rationalism,
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. 290.
Ibid.
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and contemplation aside. The scientific method would become dominant, the theory and
the demand for its proof and constant provability through repeated trials. Pushing past the
advent of practical science and empiricism, Arendt goes on to make a statement that is even
more radical in this reversal. She writes,
Actually, the change that took place in the seventeenth century was more radical
than what a simple reversal of the established traditional order between
contemplation and doing is apt to indicate. The reversal, strictly speaking,
concerned only the relationship between thinking and doing, whereas
contemplation, in the original sense of beholding the truth, was altogether
eliminated.101

Contemplation falls out here, and instead is replaced by Arendt with “thinking.” She follows
this with assurance that “thought and contemplation are not the same.” 102 And that rather,
thinking would replace contemplation. She briefly defines thinking here as something that
was originally thought, by Plato, to lead to contemplation. She writes,
Since Plato, and probably since Socrates, thinking was understood as the inner
dialogue in which one speaks with himself (erne emauto, to recall the idiom current
in Plato's dialogues); and although this dialogue lacks all outward manifestation and
even requires a more or less complete cessation of all other activities, it constitutes
in itself a highly active state.103
She argues that thinking, is actually part of the vita activa, and though while it may seem
passive, it is active. With this distinction she allows thinking to be part of her category,
action, which is part of the vita activa. This leaves the vita contemplativa and contemplation
to become “meaningless.”104
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A More Expansive Definition
I cannot argue against empiricism and the scientific method that Arendt points to with
her examples standing as our preferred methods to seek truth. This is obvious. But I am
less convinced by Arendt’s diagnosis of contemplation as meaningless. I do see basis for
the shift of focus from the vita contemplativa, to that of the vita activa. Even at its high
point, the medieval era, the first chapter shows this gradual change in focus. But I am still
unconvinced that it is meaningless, or obsolete in our own world. I argue for a more
expansive definition of contemplation than the one Arendt puts forth.
The definition she gives is quite narrow, in contrast to the two chapters previous
which show contemplation’s rich and complex background. She writes,
It is not wonder that overcomes and throws man into motionlessness, but it is
through the conscious cessation of activity, the activity of making, that the
contemplative state is reached. If one reads medieval sources on the joys and
delights of contemplation, it is as though the philosophers wanted to make sure that
homofaber would heed the call and let his arms drop…105

Arendt characterizes contemplation here in a way which can be collapsed into her own
terms, devaluing it and calling it simply the homo faber in disguise, making what might
remain of the tradition fit neatly into her description of vita activa in the modern age. She
refers to contemplation here as the “contemplative state,” a point that is reached. It is here
that I took my basis for making reference to the beatific vision earlier, which is indeed a
state that is reached, usually in the afterlife. But contemplation, as seen in previous
definitions and use by scholars in these past chapters, is much more than a state of mind—
it isan activity which one makes time for. Contemplation, while not active, is an act in the
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minds of medieval thinkers, a thing that is done or participated in. For Aristotle, this
activity, though apart from action, still something that is done for the ultimate goal of
happiness.106 He writes,
Now, if we take away action from a living being, to say nothing of production, what
is left except contemplation? Therefore, the activity of the divinity which surpasses
all others in bliss must be a contemplative activity, and the human activity which is
most closely akin to it is, therefore, most conducive to happiness.107

Aristotle refers to contemplation as an “activity” here, ἰνέργεια, energeia, or action,
operation, energy, which is different from the motionless and passive absorption of truth
that Arendt paints it to be. Arendt would classify this activity as thinking, but this activity is
clearly designated as contemplation by Aristotle. And although Arendt makes reference to
Aquinas, she fails to see the where Aquinas recognizes contemplation as more than a state,
but as something which consists of many actions. He writes,
Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed,
namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its unity. Yet it has
many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain to the reception
of principles, from which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are
concerned with deducing from the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which is
sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth…108

Contemplation is crowned by the sort of beatific vision kind of moment which Arendt
makes reference to earlier. But here Aquinas shows us that contemplation itself consists of
“many acts” before it arrives at this final stage, which he again refers to as an act. Arendt
might argue back that this “active” description of vita contemplativa would fall under the
106
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thinking, which she places under vita activa, but these subsidiary acts during
contemplation cannot be collapsed fully into her terms. As mentioned earlier, thinking and
contemplation are not the same. The personal and intimate characteristics of the tradition
and the subjective necessity, which compels it, are absent from Arendt’s definition of
thinking. Based on the thinkers and traditions examined in the past chapters, with a more
expansive definition established in Cicero’s world, I think contemplation served and could
still serve a purpose other than the pursuit of Truth in motionless solitude. The thinkers
discussed in previous chapters used contemplation not only for their faith, but also for
their intimate cares, concerns, and subjective needs.
Arendt on Private Space
Based on their writings, contemplation is an activity done purely for one’s self; it is a
meditation on subjects or problems, and personal reflection. Coloring this tradition of
contemplation is a certain degree of privacy, something that Arendt prized. Contemplation,
while often occurring alone in the medieval context, would happen in the intimate and
sheltered moments between friends in the classical world, thinking through concerns with
a confidant, like we see in Cicero and described by Aristotle. It is at the heart of private life.
Despite her narrowing of the tradition of contemplation, Arendt extols the importance of
private life and private property as support for the plurality in the public sphere. This
individualism that privacy encourages preserves our differences and subjective needs in “a
place of one’s own.”109 Arendt writes,
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…the four walls of one's private property offer the only reliable hiding place from
the common public world, not only from everything that goes on in it but also from
its very publicity, from being seen and being heard. A life spent entirely in public, in
the presence of others, becomes, as we would say, shallow. While it retains its
visibility, it loses the quality of rising into sight from some darker ground which
must remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a very real, non-subjective sense.
The only efficient way to guarantee the darkness of what needs to be hidden against
the light of publicity is private property, a privately owned place to hide in…110

The conservation of privacy pervades throughout The Human Condition as well as
throughout Arendt’s other work. Her controversial essay, Reflections on Little Rock hinges
on a protection of private spaces and private whims,111 without the intrusion of the
government on the private and social realms. She writes,
The third realm, finally, in which we move and live together with other people- the
realm of privacy- is ruled neither by equality nor by discrimination, but by
exclusiveness. Here we choose those with whom we wish to spend our lives, personal
friends and those we love; and our choice is guided not by likeness or qualities shared
by a group of people…but …by [one’s] uniqueness…112

Arendt valued this sort of private life so strongly, a place governed by free choice, that it
supported her to quite controversially criticize forced de-segregation of schools. The
protection of the subjective wants and desires of the individual is integral to her notion of

Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. 71.
The essence of her argument and its relevance to this project can be seen here:
“To force parents to send their children to an integrated school against their will means to deprive
them of rights which clearly belong to them in all free societies – the private right over their children
and the social right to free association. As for the children, forced integration means a very serious
conflict between home and school, between their private and their social life, and while such conflicts
are common in adult life, children cannot be expected to handle them and therefore should not be
exposed to them.”
Arendt, Hannah, “Reflections on Little Rock.”
112 Arendt, Hannah, “Reflections on Little Rock.” 52.

110

111

62
freedom and individuality. Hence, this is why it is so shocking that she casts aside
contemplation so quickly.
Contemplation is at the heart of this private life, providing a respite of “four walls”
from public duties, a complete giving over to subjective needs and personal thoughts that
must be dealt with. A life without this privacy could become what Arendt would call
“shallow,” just as a life without contemplation is warned against as unsatisfying by many
thinkers. And while Arendt does not account specifically for contemplation in her writings
on private life, contemplation, in its less narrow definition is not opposed to the defining
characteristic of private life and its importance.
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Conclusion
These Four Walls:
Finding Contemplation in a Secular World

We live in a world where the each moment has the capability to be made public.
Through the unimaginable recent progression of communication technologies and rise of
online social networks, our lives now have infinitely more possibilities to be shared with
hundreds, or even thousands of people. No one is forced to share these moments, but many
they choose to do so. Posting pictures or making announcements online was once reserved
for major life events like graduations, weddings, and birthdays. But coverage is no longer
reserved for these key moments, but given to every second. Technology is actually
designed in a way that encourages the broadcasting of the every day. Again, this sharing is
usually dependent on choice. Some, many even, would never dream of posting a picture of
their morning’s oatmeal and banana at the dining hall with a sepia tinted filter. But if they
wished to – they could. In comparison to other eras, this makes our own difficult to
understand in respect to public and private space. Theoretically, we could have privacy
away from the public gaze with friends or by ourselves. Unlike the Romans, we are
privileged to be able to find time alone. But in comparison to the medieval lives discussed
in the first chapter, our lives are much more public in their potential. This puts us in a
complex position. We do not yet have the continuum of public and private distinctions that
Rome experienced, with privacy defined only by the deprivation of the public. We live in a
time graced with what might seem like an enormous privilege, with the choice to make
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certain things public and others private. But more and more people have become
interested in broadcasting their breakfasts or telling the world about the bad traffic on
their morning commutes. These types of posts, tweets, and statuses, are commonplace. This
makes the information shared with friends, in a private four walls, all the more valuable.
With a higher value placed on these chosen and selected moments, the need for
contemplation is most vital.
Contemplation in a Secular World
But where might we find contemplation in our own world? For someone of
particularly strong faith, the definitions provided in the first chapter might sustain them.
But for those who do not, and even for those who do, I contend that contemplation can still
be found in other places.
As it was in Cicero’s world, studying or schooling can still be a place of
contemplation. Books continue to provide counsel, respite, and meaning to many lives. The
drive to study, whether humanities related or not, provides the strong subjective necessity
needed for contemplation. The passion that drives one person to read novels might be the
same for another to study the complex species relationship within an ecosystem. In all
cases, there is a drive to pursue this study not for the practical benefits, but for the personal
meaning the work brings to life. Being a student or simply being enrolled in school is not
enough. Enrollment and degree status is actually inconsequential to contemplation. A
student doing schoolwork solely for the purpose of getting a degree or a job would not be
considered to be contemplating during their study.113 But someone studying or doing

Though often related to schoolwork, I use the word study in that it means a genuine
commitment to something, just as Aristotle uses the word previously quoted in passages from
Nicomachean Ethics.

113
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anything with commitment because it has great personal qualifies as contemplation. The
personal need to do, read or study this might not be explicit, but the feeling to do it is
intense and motivating. Professors who spend their life studying a topic because of this
feeling of intense personal motivation, not the aspect of getting a job, would be the
candidates for contemplation.
An expected criticism of this mode of contemplation might be an accusation of
elitism, or ivory tower worship. But contemplation in our secular world is not necessarily
steeped in blue blood nor does it exist only as the elitists’ idol, though it may have it once
may have been guilty of such. The passion that exists to do something or partake in
something that brings meaning exists outside the university. Those who read Danielle
Steele again and again with fervor and feel a certain subjective necessity to read her novels,
experience their own version of contemplation in the modern age. The teenagers who rush
home every day after school to re-watch a favorite movie for another time, not for its
entertainment value alone, but for the meaning it imparts and critical ideas it conjures, they
too experiences contemplation. For these are things done not for means of public good or
practical profit, but instead satisfy a personal and private need.
And perhaps the least elite version of contemplation that exists in our world occurs
within the bonds of friendship. Like Cicero writes, friendship offers respite and place to
mull over personal cares, concerns, and reflections on life. In the context of our own world,
with infinite sharing capabilities, the choice for something to remain private amongst
friends has become all the more valuable. This might happen through re-occurring email
exchanges that call out for counsel and support. Or late night phone calls to a far away
friend in times of need. Contemplation is found in the personal exchanges had in Arendt’s
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“these four walls”114 and by the self created privacy, when those closest to you keep your
thoughts private.
Keeping Wounds Open
I acknowledge that these moments of personal exchange between friends, and time
spent alone reading a book of one’s choice can be increasingly hard to find due to financial
constraints and day-to-day demands. I do not deny Arendt’s claim that our world is
emphatically focused on vita activa. This happened even during contemplation’s high point,
and it is problematic now more than ever. Private whims and personal desires were and
are still sacrificed for the perceived collective good. This is why Barack Obama’s education
reform can be seen as problematic. With funding going toward programs primarily
concerned with using studies and education for practical outputs, where is there space for
the interests and passions of those who might not be interested in STEM? The
encouragement of following subjective passions and necessities often starts in school, with
the student being introduced to a variety of subjects and experiences. If these experiences
are limited, or taught in a way that only emphasizes their practical output, contemplation
has begun to be evicted from our public schools. I fear the days when no space is given in
schools or in life to follow personal passions that might guard against an overwhelming
shallowness and impersonal existence.
What I fear more than the defunding or disregard for contemplation by our government or
society, would be that the individual would become numb to this loss of contemplation.
Again, contemplation, even at its height was not always given the time and space needed.
But the desire for it, despite the shift in focus, was there. Arendt misses this point entirely
114

“These four walls” is the repeated phrase Arendt uses throughout her work when referencing
privacy, to designate a safe and private space for the individual to thrive.
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when discussing contemplation. Perhaps the most prevailing characteristic throughout the
tradition of contemplation is the deep longing for it despite knowing that duties of the
active life will take precedent in daily life. Monks must preach and write. Cicero must go
about politics while Atticus must study in Athens. And we must deal with daily demands
before giving ourselves over to a favorite book or an intense conversation with a friend.
This has not changed. Vita activa and vita contemplativa continue to exist in tandem, giving
value to each other. But the desire still exists, in the moment a student ceases what they are
doing to finish a paper or feels the urgency to get back to an experiment, or moments
where we desperately want to get to a friend to confide in; these are moments of wanting
contemplation. While it may be hard to make time for them, it is the desire alone, to give
meaning and depth in our lives, to steal us away from the public eye, that matters. Whether
or not we can indulge in them is inconsequential, because the importance is the recognition
of this want, the knowledge that the wound prevails. As long children and parents continue
to complain about a system of schooling that overburdens children with the responsibility
of the global market, professors long for their sabbaticals, and good friends miss each other
over long distances; the desire for the contemplative life remains alive. We might look to
give it more space in our very active world and cherish the meaning it could bring to our
lives. Though this desire, even amongst a world that often chooses to exist outside “these
four walls,” will keep our wounds open, protecting us from a scarred and shallow existence.
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Appendix
Rosa Celeste: Dante and Beatrice gaze upon the highest Heaven, The
Empyrean. Gustave Doré
Doré, 1892.
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